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The US–Israeli attack on Iran, followed by Iranian retaliation against US assets across the region, has shaken one of the Gulf’s most valuable assets: its reputation for stability. For decades, Gulf states have cultivated an image of security and predictability in an otherwise turbulent region. Cities such as Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi positioned themselves as global hubs for aviation, finance, tourism, culture and energy export, functioning as gateways between East and West and attracting investors through favourable tax regimes and high returns.

Events over the last six weeks have demonstrated how quickly this perception can unravel. Escalating Iranian aggression in the name of retaliation to US-Israeli attacks, airspace closures, and threats to critical infrastructure, including energy facilities and desalination plants, have highlighted the region’s continued exposure to geopolitical volatility. In the immediate aftermath, thousands of Western residents and companies evacuated the region or temporarily suspended operations, underscoring the demographic and economic vulnerabilities inherent in the Gulf’s current development model.

Beyond the immediate security crisis, the conflict has exposed deeper structural weaknesses in the Gulf’s strategic environment. In recent years regional governments invested considerable diplomatic capital in reducing tensions with Iran. The Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia had raised expectations that the region might gradually move beyond decades of confrontation. At the same time, Gulf states continued to deepen their security partnerships with the United States, with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain further expanding political, security, and intelligence cooperation with Israel. Following the brief but intense twelve-day confrontation in June 2025, many regional observers believed that these arrangements should be consolidated even further to guarantee a more stable security environment. 

These assumptions were challenged when the United States and Israel pursued military action without consultation with their Gulf partners. Iran’s retaliatory strikes not only violated Gulf sovereignty but also disrupted critical oil and gas lifelines across the region. The episode revealed the limits of external security guarantees and raised questions about the extent to which Gulf strategic concerns are incorporated into the calculations of major powers.

Energy Security and Market Confidence

Energy markets are unforgiving when it comes to geopolitical risk. Importing states cannot afford to wait for conflicts to conclude before securing alternative supplies. Once reliability is questioned, diversification follows quickly. This dynamic is particularly significant for liquefied natural gas (LNG), which occupies a central role in the long-term economic strategies of several Gulf states. Unlike oil, which is often traded on flexible spot markets, LNG depends heavily on long-term contracts and predictable delivery schedules. When these arrangements are disrupted, rebuilding commercial relationships can take years.

The experience following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 illustrates the speed with which markets adjust. According to the International Energy Agency’s Gas Market Report (2024), both European and Asian importers diversified supply sources in order to reduce geopolitical exposure. Although higher prices initially benefited Gulf exporters, they simultaneously increased the competitiveness of American oil and gas. Under sustained political pressure from Washington, US energy exports replaced much of Europe’s previous reliance on Russian gas.

A comparable shift now threatens Gulf exporters. While Europe has become increasingly dependent on American supplies, traditional Gulf customers in Asia are hedging their exposure. Disruptions at Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial complex forced QatarEnergy to declare force majeure on several LNG contracts, allowing buyers to seek alternative suppliers. India has expanded imports of discounted Russian crude, while countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and Japan have diversified LNG procurement to reduce vulnerability to supply interruptions and price volatility.

For Gulf exporters, the strategic implication is clear. Restoring confidence in long-term supply reliability is essential. Protecting energy infrastructure and securing export routes while also developing alternative corridors must therefore become central pillars of post-conflict recovery. Achieving this requires a broader strategic outlook that situates the Gulf within the wider economic and political geography of the Arab region.

Questioning External Security Dependence

The crisis is likely to intensify debate over the Gulf’s longstanding reliance on external security guarantees. These questions had already begun to emerge following the escalation in June 2025 and the Israeli strike in Doha targeting Hamas negotiators during ongoing mediation efforts. Such events raised difficult questions regarding the extent to which Gulf security concerns are incorporated into the strategic calculations of external partners.

For decades, policymakers in Washington and Tel Aviv operated on the assumption that Arab states would absorb the regional consequences of military actions in the region. The latest conflict demonstrates the risks inherent in this assumption.

Europe’s evolving strategic posture offers a useful comparison. For many years European governments broadly aligned with Washington’s preferences. However, as political dynamics within the United States shifted toward more unilateral and hardline positions, several European states gradually reassessed this approach. While remaining committed to transatlantic cooperation, European governments have become increasingly willing to articulate independent positions when their own interests are at stake. Their reluctance to participate in the recent war against Iran reflects not only the absence of prior consultation but also concerns regarding legality, legitimacy, and domestic political perception when allying themselves with a genocidal regime and prime minister wanted in the Hague on war crimes.

A central lesson emerges from this experience. The growing integration of Israel into regional security arrangements - through frameworks such as the Abraham Accords and incorporation into the United States Central Command structure - requires reassessment. The Abraham Accords were presented as a historic opportunity to reshape the Middle East through economic cooperation, technological exchange and a new regional security architecture. However, incorporating Israel into Gulf security arrangements has also imported one of the world’s most polarized and enduring conflicts directly into the Gulf strategic environment and, as far as their large neighbor is concerned, brought the fire closer to the oil. For states whose prosperity depends heavily on stability, embedding themselves within such highly contested alignments may increase rather than reduce exposure to regional escalation.

The Strategic Importance of Gulf Unity

Individually, smaller states possess limited leverage when negotiating with major powers that increasingly approach international relations through transactional bargaining. Institutional cooperation can therefore significantly enhance bargaining power.

European institutions such as NATO and the European Union demonstrate how collective frameworks strengthen negotiating positions. Acting through these institutions, European states have been better able to resist bilateral pressure from larger allies and defend their own strategic interests. Their collective refusal to participate in a war not aligned with their priorities illustrates the value of coordinated diplomacy.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) faces a similar challenge. When the GCC operates as a collection of individual states, external actors can negotiate separately with each government, exploiting existing mistrust and creating asymmetric dependencies. A more coordinated Gulf approach to security policy, diplomacy, and energy strategy would significantly strengthen the region’s ability to protect its interests.

The recent conflict underscores the urgency of such coordination. Israel and the United States launched its attack despite knowing that retaliation would likely place Gulf states - many of which host US military facilities - within Iran’s potential strike range. The consequences were immediate: missile and drone attacks across Gulf airspace, threats to energy infrastructure and disruption to maritime shipping routes.

This raises an important strategic question: did normalization reduce the Gulf’s exposure to regional conflict, or did it bring the region closer to the front line?

The issue remains politically sensitive and divisive. Precisely for this reason, it requires collective reassessment rather than fragmented national approaches. If Gulf states evaluate normalization individually, external actors will continue to shape the region’s strategic environment according to their own priorities.

The Abraham Accords ultimately reflected a particular vision of regional order largely designed in Washington and Tel Aviv. This framework imagined a Middle East structured around security cooperation with Israel and economic integration driven by US strategic priorities. While this vision promised stability and prosperity, recent events reveal its limitations.

Reimagining Regional Integration

Reassessing security arrangements must also involve reconsidering the region’s economic geography. A more sustainable strategy would place the region itself, its societies, economies and historical connections, at the center of integration. This requires looking not only outward toward global markets but also inward toward the Gulf’s natural hinterland.

Strengthening economic corridors linking the Arabian Peninsula with neighboring regions - from Yemen along the Arabian Sea through Iraq and toward Jordan, Syria and the Mediterranean - could create a different model of regional connectivity. Rail networks, highways, and energy pipelines could transform these routes into corridors of trade and prosperity, connecting Gulf economies with Levantine and Mediterranean markets. Such an approach would diversify infrastructure while anchoring Gulf stability and security (not just physical, but food, labor, and economic) in regional economic interdependence rather than external security alignments. By investing in connectivity across neighboring regions, Gulf states could contribute to economic development in areas long affected by instability while simultaneously reducing their own exposure to great-power rivalries and increasing their own food, labor, and other forms of security. Some would argue that is expensive, but now that we have seen the real cost of insecurity the calculations are different. 

Time for Change

The Gulf has repeatedly demonstrated resilience in the face of regional upheaval. However, the current crisis illustrates that long-term stability cannot rely indefinitely on external guarantees or externally designed regional frameworks.

A new regional vision is therefore required, one shaped primarily by the priorities and interests of the region itself. For Gulf states, this means strengthening collective diplomacy, reassessing existing security arrangements, and investing in economic connectivity that links the Arabian Peninsula more closely with its surrounding regions.

For centuries, the Gulf has functioned as a crossroads of trade, culture, and geopolitics. The strategic challenge now is to ensure that it remains a center of connectivity rather than evolving into a permanent frontline of confrontation.

Dr. Sultan Barakat is a Professor at the College of Public Policy at Hamad Bin Khalifa University.